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ESSAYS
Henry Lord Brougham, Written by Himself*
MONROE H. FREEDMAN**

In a recent article,1 Professors Fred C. Zacharias and Bruce A. Green have
made an error in discussing Henry Lord Brougham's famous declaration about
the duty of zealous representation that lawyers owe to their clients. 2 The purpose
of this essay is to correct that error, which first appeared in a 1907 book by John
Dos Passos.3
As part of their article, Zacharias and Green argue that lawyers should adopt
the ethic of "professional conscience" expressed by a nineteenth century
Pennsylvania judge, John Bannister Gibson, rather than the client-centered ethic
of Brougham.4 As the authors explain it, Gibson's ethic of professional
conscience means that "lawyers' duties of zealous advocacy are limited by duties
to the court that are implicit in the lawyer's professional role, capable of being
articulated, and, in some cases, judicially enforced.",5 This appears to be simply a
truism 6 and not a basis for "reconceptualizing advocacy ethics." The focus of this
essay, however, is to suggest that Zacharias and Green's reliance on Gibson as a
* This title is taken from the title of Brougham's three-volume autobiography, The Life and Times of Henry
Lord Brougham, Written by Himself.
** Professor of Law, Hofstra University Law School. Author, UnderstandingLawyers'Ethics(3rd ed. 2004)
(with Abbe Smith). I am grateful to Lisa Spar, Assistant Director for Reference and Instructional Services at the
Deane Law Library, Hofstra University, for her invaluable research assistance.
1. Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, ReconceptualizingAdvocacy Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1
(2005).
2. For the text of Brougham's quote, see infra text accompanying note 21.
3. JOHN R. Dos PAssos, THE AMERIcAN LAWYER: As HE WAS-As HE Is-As HE CAN BE 142-43 (Fred B.
Rothman & Co. 1986) (1907).
4. Zacharias & Green, supranote 1, at 2.
5. Id. at 6.
6. The view that a lawyer's duty of zealous advocacy must be tempered by the lawyer's duties to the court
has already been adopted by the American Bar Association and state codes of professional ethics. See, e.g.,
MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CoNDucr (2004) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]; N.Y CODE OF PROF'L REsPoNSIBiLrrY
Canon 7 (2002) ("A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law."). DR 7-101(a)
says that a lawyer "shall not intentionally (1) [flail to seek the lawful objectives of the client through reasonably
available means ....But that language (which itself is restricted to what is lawful) is immediately subjected to
the limitation: "permitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules... "The entire remainder of Canon 7, from DR
7-101(b) through DR 7-110, deals with restrictionson zealous representation, that is, with actions that a lawyer
may forgo, or that the lawyer is forbidden to take, on behalf of the client. These restrictions are, of course, both
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moral authority is misplaced, and, more importantly, to correct the erroneous
assertion that Brougham repudiated his classic statement regarding zealous
representation.
Zacharias and Green hold up Judge Gibson as "an intellectual giant" 7 whose
moral pronouncements are entitled to our respect. It is therefore worth taking
note of Gibson's moral authority, or lack of it, as revealed in his opinion in Hobbs
v. Fogg.8 Although Zacharias and Green certainly do not share Gibson's racism,
Gibson himself is impeachable on that ground.
William Fogg was an African American who had been emancipated by a state
statute.9 He sued because he had been denied the right to vote. 10 On the basis of
undisputed facts establishing that Fogg was a freeman and otherwise qualified to
vote, the trial judge directed a verdict for Fogg."
Gibson reversed. 12 "[O]ur ancestors settled the province as a community of
white men," he declared, "and the blacks were introduced into it as a race of
slaves."' 13 Accordingly, they are not capable, because of their "caste,"' 4 of
being "party to our social compact."' 5 Expressing his notion of professional
judicial conscience, Gibson concluded that "[c]onsiderations of mere humanity... belong to a class with which, as judges, we have nothing to do; and
interpreting the [federal] constitution in the spirit of our institutions, we are
bound to pronounce that men of colour are destitute of title to the elective
franchise." 16 Thus, Gibson distinguished himself by anticipating DredScott v.
Sandford 7 by twenty years.
By contrast, during the same period, Henry Lord Brougham was an ardent
and eloquent abolitionist. 8 He insisted that the slave was his brother and "as
fit for his freedom as any English peasant, ay, or any Lord whom I now
address."' 9 Moreover, Brougham demanded that the emancipated slave have
his liberty and his rights "without stint."2 0 That speech was delivered by
Brougham to the House of Lords in 1838, just one year after Gibson wrote his
opinion in Hobbs v. Fogg.
articulated and capable of being judicially enforced. Moreover, none of them is inconsistent with Brougham's
declaration.
7. Zacharias & Green, supra note 1, at 4.
8. 6 Watts 553 (Pa. 1837).
9. See id. at 556.
10. See id. at 557-58.
11. Id. at 560.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 558.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 560.
17. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
18. See generally 10 WORKS OF HENRY LORD BROUGHAM (Adam & Charles Black eds., 1873).
19. Id. at 279.
20. Id. at 243, 279 ("Emancipation of Negro Apprentices").
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Turning now to Zacharias and Green's error regarding Brougham, here is his
famous statement, which was made in defense of the Queen in Queen Caroline's
Case in 1820:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the
world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst them, to
himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not
regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others.
Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on reckless
of the consequences, though it should be his unhappy fate to involve his
country in confusion.2 l
That statement has stood as the ideal of zealous representation for English and
American lawyers for almost two centuries since then.2 2
In their article, Zacharias and Green incorrectly assert that Brougham later
repudiated his statement.2 3 Their only documentation for this assertion is a
questionable secondary source, a 1907 book by a lawyer named Dos Passos. 24
According to Dos Passos, "as far back as 1859, the author of those destructive
and unfounded views [that is, Brougham], in a letter to Mr. Forsyth, publicly
repudiated them by saying that they were used as a sort of political menace." 2 5
That sentence is the entire basis for the conclusion, first by Dos Passos and
then by Zacharias and Green, that Brougham repudiated his statement. However,
as discussed below, Mr. Forsyth did not understand Brougham's letter to have
been a repudiation.26 More importantly, the fact that the statement had been
delivered as a "political menace" was precisely what made it so powerful and
that, at the same time, demonstrated just how far a lawyer should be prepared to
go on behalf of a client.
The Queen had been charged with adultery (of which she was almost certainly

21. 2 THE TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 3 (1821).

22. The view expressed in Brougham's declaration was recognized in drafting the 1908 Canons of
Professional Ethics. Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal
Government Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 951, 961 (1991); see also CANONS OF
PROF'L ETHics Canon 15 (1908). Brougham's view was reaffirmed in the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility and continues to play a role under the current Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Lanctot,
supra,at 962; MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1, 5-21 (1983); MODEL RULES pmbl. 2, 9; MODEL
RULES R. 1.3 cmt. 1. See generally MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMTM, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHics 71
(3d ed. 2004).
23. Zacharias & Green, supra note 1, at 2. But see infra text accompanying notes 40-46.
24. Zacharias & Green, supra note 1, at 2 n.3 (citing Dos PAssos, supra note 3).
25. DoS PASSOS, supra note 3, at 142-43 (citing WLLIAM FORSYTH, THE HISTORY OF LAWYERS ANCIENT AND
MODERN 380 n. (Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 1998) (1875)).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 52-55. In addition, Dos Passos even misquoted Brougham. He reports
the quotation as including the phrase, "separating even the duties of a parent from those of an advocate ......
Dos PASSOS, supra note 3, at 142 (substituting "parent" for "patriot"); see supra text accompanying note 21.
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guilty). 27 Conviction would have resulted in her divorce from the King and the
loss of her title. In his opening statement at the Queen's trial, Brougham delivered
a fearsome threat-or, as he called it in his letter to Forsyth, a "menace." As
Brougham explained in his autobiography, this threat was "neither more nor less
than impeaching the King's own title, by proving that he had forfeited the
crown." 28 The ground for the King's expulsion from the throne was that "[h]e had
married a Roman Catholic (Mrs. Fitzherbert) while heir-apparent," and such a
marriage is "declared by the Act of Settlement to be a forfeiture of the crown, 'as
ifhe were naturallydead."' 29 Therefore, to drive his threat home, Brougham had
prefaced it by saying that, if the case should reach a point at which an attack on
not "hesitate one
the King were justified to protect the Queen, then he would
30
duty."
paramount
[that]
of
discharge
moment in the fearless
Brougham's threat was particularly potent because of the dangerous social and
political unrest at the time of the trial. 3 ' As Brougham reported, members of the
army, like the people of England generally, held their allegiance to the Queen as
well as the King.3 2 Indeed, many enthusiastically favored the Queen, and the
members of one cavalry regiment vowed that they would "fight up to their knees
in blood for their queen.",3 3 Other troops mutinied, and in daily demonstrations by
mobs of people, "the soldiers showed plain signs of being with the multitude. 34
Because of these demonstrations, a "great barrier" had to be erected to "[break]
the force of the crowd ' 3 5 and to allow the peers, who "actually feared for their
personal safety, ' 3 6 to enter and leave the House. 7 There were also nights of mob
violence against the residences of the King's ministers and intimates.38 In
Brougham's own view, if he had been forced to carry out his threat, it could have
meant that "civil war was inevitable. 3 9
Nevertheless, Brougham's opening statement, including his threat to undo the

27. FLORA FRASER, THE UNRULY QUEEN: THE LiFE OF QUEEN CAROLINE 264 (1996) (Regarding a principal
charge in the Bill against the Queen: "There can be no doubt that [Bartolomeo Pergami], now her servant,
became her lover .... "). However, Brougham himself wrote: "Of the utter groundlessness of those charges [I]
had the most complete and unhesitating belief." 2 HENRY LORD BROUGHAM, THE LiwE AND TIMES OF HENRY
LORD BROUGHAM, WRrrrEN BY HimSELF 291 (1871). He added, though, that he was acquainted with "great

indiscretions" on the Queen's part that were unrelated to the charges against her. Id.
28. 2 BROUGHAM, supra note 27, at 309.

29. Id. at 309-10.
30. Id. at 308-09 n.
31. See id. at 307-08; FRAsER, supranote 27, at 382-83.
32. 2 BROUGHAM, supra note 27, at 307-08.
33. Id. at 307.
34. Id. at 308.
35. Id.
36. E.A. SMrrH, A QUEEN ON TRIAL: THE AFFAIR OF QUEEN
Hamilton, the Queen's closest attendant during the trial).
37. 2 BROUGHAM, supra note 27, at 308.
38. FRASER, supra note 27, at 382.
39. 2 BROUGHAM, supra note 27, at 311.

CAROLINE

67 (1993) (quoting Lady Anne
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King, was "acclaimed as brilliant" 40 and has been recognized as "a masterly
performance."' 4 ' As Brougham finished, "the aged Lord Erskine, former Lord
Chancellor, [was so moved that he] rushed from the chamber in tears."4 2 Another
barrister declared that Lord Brougham's opening statement was "one of the most
powerful orations that ever proceeded from human lips."'4 3 Dissenting from those
views, Lord Chancellor Eldon (an enemy of the Queen) later "rebuked Brougham
most weightily for his threats to the House"4-that is, for what Eldon saw as
Brougham's overzealousness on behalf of his client. Nevertheless, Brougham
was "the hero of the hour,"45 and he subsequently succeeded Eldon as Lord
Chancellor of England.4 6
Thus, Brougham successfully engaged in a classic case, and perhaps our earliest
example, of what we now call graymail. The term refers to a threat by a criminal
defendant to reveal, in the course of the defense, classified information that is harmful
or embarrassing to the government to induce the government to drop the charges.47
Brougham's autobiography makes clear that he never repudiated his famous
declaration. In a preface addressed "To the Reader," Brougham wrote: "[T]he
Narrative is to be printed AS I HAVE WRITTEN IT .... I will have no Editor
employed to alter, or rewrite, what I desire shall be published as EXCLUSIVELY
MY OWN."'4 8 With that introduction, half a century after having delivered his
graymail threat, Brougham proudly reiterated and defended that threat with
modifications that did not diminish its substance or force.4 9 Indeed, Brougham's

40. SMrrH, supranote 36, at 110.
41. FRASER, supra note 27, at 433.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 438.
45. Id. at 443.
46. Id. at 465.
47. A modern practitioner of graymail was the renowned criminal defense lawyer, Edward Bennett Williams.
His most famous of several such cases was his defense in 1976 of Richard Helms, the former director of the
CIA. Helms had been charged with lying to a Senate committee by denying the CIA's role in attempting to
defeat the election of Salvador Allende in Chile. Emulating Brougham's "menace," Williams gave an early leak
to Bob Woodward of the Washington Post: "If Helms tells what he knows, the government won't be able to
function. We won't be able to have an embassy in any South American capital. It'll raze the presidency, the
judiciary, and the intelligence establishment if this comes out!" EvAN THOMAS, EDWARD BENNEr WILLIAMS:
ULTIMATE INSIDER; LEGENDARY TRIAL LAWYER 341 (1991). The Justice Department backed down, and Helms

was allowed to plead nollo contendere to reduced charges of "misleading" the committee. He served no jail
time, and Williams announced on the courthouse steps that Helms would "wear this conviction like a badge of
honor." Id. at 344.
The effectiveness of graymail has been reduced since 1980 by the Classified Information Procedures Act, 18
U.S.C.A. app. 3 (2006). See, e.g., United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544
U.S. 931 (2005); see also Neil A. Lewis, ProsecutorSays Libby Seeks To Thwart Criminal Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 18, 2006, at All (reporting the charge by Patrick J. Fitzgerald that 1. Lewis ("Scooter") Libby has
demanded "extraordinarily sensitive" government documents in a "transparent effort at 'graymail').
48. 1 BROUGHAM, supranote 27, at 12 (Preface with Brougham's instructions to the executor of his estate).
49. The quotation in the autobiography (1871) is not identical to the original at the trial (1820). Here is the
version from the autobiography:
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final modification of the statement characterized it as the advocate's "sacred
duty."' 50 As his final assessment of his role in the matter, Brougham wrote: "On
looking back to that time of anxiety because of serious hazards ... I feel that I
had nothing wherewith to reproach myself .... , 5 1
Return now to William Forsyth, to whom Brougham wrote the letter that was quoted
and then corrupted into a repudiation by Dos Passos, whose book Zacharias and Green
relied on in their recent article. Forsyth also published a book discussing Brougham's
letter in 1875, four years after the publication of Brougham's autobiography. In this
book, Forsyth quoted not the original threat, but the modified version that appeared in
Brougham's autobiography.5 2 It appears, therefore, that Forsyth was familiar with the
autobiography and, as a consequence, with Brougham's support of his statement in it.
Also, Brougham's letter to Forsyth, written twelve years prior to the publication of
Brougham's autobiography, says nothing about repudiation. On the contrary, in the
letter Brougham wrote:
I was prepared, in case of necessity, that is, in case the Bill [against the Queen]
passed the Lords, to do two things-first, to resist it in the Commons with the
country at my back; but next, if need be, to dispute the King's title, to show he
had forfeited the crown by marrying a Catholic, in the words of the Act "as if he
were naturally dead." What I said was fully understood by Geo. IV [and
others], and I am confident
it would have prevented them from pressing the Bill
53
beyond a certain point.

Thus, Forsyth could not have thought-and did not say-that Brougham had
repudiated his statement.

[A]n advocate, by the sacred duty which he owes his client, knows, in the discharge of that office, but
one person in the world, THAT CLIENT AND NONE OTHER. To save that client by all expedient
means - to protect that client at all hazards and costs to all others, and among others to himself - is the
highest and most unquestioned of his duties; and he must not regard the alarm, the suffering, the
torment, the destruction, which he may bring upon any other. Nay, separating even the duties of a
patriot from those of an advocate, and casting them, if need be, to the wind, he must go on reckless of
the consequences, if his fate it should unhappily be, to involve his country in confusion for his client's
protection!
2 BROUGHAM, supra note 27, at 308-09 n.
The most significant differences between the versions are that "the discharge of his duty" has become "the
sacred duty that he owes his client" and "his first and only duty" has become "the highest and most unquestioned
of his duties."
The change appears to have been deliberate. In 1838 Brougham published Speeches of Henry Lord Brougham
(in four volumes). In that publication, the version of his declaration of the advocate's duty is the same as that in
the autobiography, with the exception that the 1838 version uses dashes rather than commas in one passage:
"and he must not regard the alarm-the suffering-the torment-the destruction-which he may bring upon
any other." 1 SPEECHES OF HENRY LORD BROUGHAM 105 (1838); see 2 BROUGHAM, supra note 27, at 309 n.
50. See 2 BROUGHAM, supra note 27, at 309 n.
51. Id. at 315-16.
52. WELItAm FORSYTH, THE HISTORY OF LAWYERS ANCIENT AND MODERN 380 (Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.
1998) (1875). For the modified version, see supra note 49.
53. FORSYTH, supra note 52, at 380-81 n.1 (quoting a letter the author received from Brougham in 1859).
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What Forsyth did was to contend that Brougham's statement was not to be
taken literally as a model for the lawyer's role. Rather. he argued, it was an
advocate's defense of his client, and therefore should be given more latitude and
not be "tested by the same canons according to which we criticise [sic] the
opinions expressed in an essay or a sermon."'54 In his letter to Forsyth, Brougham
did write that his statement had been "a menace," not "a deliberate and
well-considered opinion."5 5 However, what Brougham meant by this, and what
Forsyth understood it to mean from the full context of the letter, was that
Brougham had leveled a threat of what we now call "graymail," not made a
dispassionate legal argument. And, as both his letter to Forsyth and his
autobiography make clear, far from repudiating the statement, Brougham
maintained the rightness of his "menace."
The short of it is, therefore, that Brougham was indeed ready to "go on reckless
of the consequences" and to "involve his country in confusion," a course that he
later characterized in his autobiography as having been his "sacred duty.",56 In
that sense, Brougham's conduct was an even more powerful declaration of the
advocate's duty than was the statement itself (and more powerful, surely, than
any "sermon or essay").
Professors Zacharias and Green relied on the questionable secondary authority
of Dos Passos and accordingly published the incorrect assertion that Henry Lord
Brougham eventually repudiated the famous statement about the advocate's duty
to his client that he had made in Queen Caroline's Case. However, the truth is
quite contrary to what Dos Passos said. In fact, in an autobiography written half a
century after the Queen's trial, Brougham reiterated his statement and stood
on zealous advocacy as
behind it. 57 Moreover, he characterized his declaration
58
the "sacred duty that [the advocate] owes his client."
Those are Brougham's final words on the subject, "Written by Himself."

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 382.
Id. at 380 n.1.
2 BROUGHAM, supra note 27, at 309 n.
Id.
Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 50.

